NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 24
Number 4 A Century of Legal Education

Article 6

6-1-1946

Teaching Theory and Practice in the New Day
Merton LeRoy Ferson

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Merton L. Ferson, Teaching Theory and Practice in the New Day, 24 N.C. L. Rev. 423 (1946).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol24/iss4/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

TEACHING THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE
NEW DAY
MERTON LERoY FERsoN*

Law schools are expected to do two things: One is to implant in the
mind of each student a background of legal theory and the other is to
teach him what is called the practice of law.
Time was when candidates prepared themselves for admission to the
bar by reading in lawyers' offices. The student was expected thus to
master the theory of the law and at the same time to learn how to act
in the role of a lawyer. Some excellent lawyers were thus developed.
Law practice at that time was largely forensic. The student's association
with a practicing lawyer was well adapted to develop his technique in
that kind of practice; but legal theory was not adequately taught in a
good many offices.
Law schools took over the work of preparing students for admission
to the bar. Few persons would question the superiority of a standard
law school over a typical law office as a means of teaching legal theory.
Forensic practice, however, is difficult to teach in a law school and most
graduates fresh from law schools need further training before they are
qualified to conduct litigation.
The shortcomings of law schools have been the subject of much
lamenting. Teachers have been devastating in their criticisms of current
legal education.' Nevertheless, there have been few significant changes
in the courses taught or in teaching methods during the last generation.
However good or bad legal education has been in the past, it behooves
law schools at this time to heed- the changed conditions of practice.
Social and political ideas have changed. Litigation has given way to
negotiation. The lawyer has come to have less business in the courts
and more in the administrative tribunals. His cases are not so likely
to involve a dispute between one individual and another individual as
they are to involve a dispute between an individual and the government.
Specialization in practice is more common than was formerly the case.
Utility corporations are being supplanted in wide areas by "Authorities."
The very literature used by the practicing lawyers has changed; law
reports are giving way to "Services." The practice of law in the sense
* Dean and Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Cincinnati. From
1924 to 1926, Dean and Professor of Law, School of Law, University of North
Carolina.
'Harold Dwight Laswell and Myres Smith McDougal, Legal Education and
Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 203
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of the activities of a lawyer in the service of clients has changed in
scope and character. Court work now-a-days takes only a fraction of
a lawyer's time; in most instances it is only a small fraction. This
broader scope of practice should be kept in mind by a law school in
laying out its new program.
In view of the fault that has been found with legal education, and
in view of the changed conditions of practice, law schools are on the
spot. But the critics mentioned above do not mean to say that the law
schools are altogether failing to do what can justly be expected of them.
On the contrary, the critics-mostly teachers-are zealous critics because they are zealous believers in the law schools. On the whole, our
law schools deserve considerable credit for the calibre of the men they
have graduated and for the improvement they have wrought in the law
itself. It is in order, however, that law school men should consider
ways and means to turn out graduates who are better fitted for modern
practice.
The law is indeed a "seamless web," and by that token the theoretical subjects are entwined with the practice subjects. There is an
advantage, however, in setting apart for teaching purposes the theoretical courses and the practice courses, and for accentuating the difference between them. One type of course has to do with the lawyer's
mental background; the other has to do with his legal workmanship. A
teaching technique that is most effective in teaching theory may not be
well adapted to the teaching of practice. And the literature on which
the respective types of course are based may well be different. Our
usual pabulum of adjudicated cases is admirable-even by itself-for
teaching theory. But when we come to teach the practice in a given
field we need something additional to bring out the special problems in
that field.
Can we make a case for the teaching of legal theory, at all, in this
new day when rules of thumb constitute such a large part of our law?
Has theory any practical value? We have a flood of new rules, regulations, directives, and interpretations. They come from boards, commissions, and directors. They purport to be explicit and to regulate in
detail the facts and processes of life in human society. All these new
rules and interpretations from administrative agencies are additions to
the vast and ever growing bulk of statutes and cases. It is all grist for
the lawyer. How shall he master it? Must every student learn it?
Should law schools teach it? Impossible! Anyway, it would be a
waste of time. Most of it the student will never have occasion to use.
Much of'it will be changed. But a lawyer should be able to master and
apply the part he needs. He should have the power to implement the
numerous statutes and administrative rules; and that power is more than
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the ability to read English. The ability to use a piece of law includes

knowledge of its background, its place in legal outline, and its relation
to established doctrines of common law. In short, it calls for legal
theory.
Every graduate should have power to analyze legal material, a background against which to interpret it, and a framework to help him put
it in order. An observation recently made by Dean Pound is in point.
He said, "Knowledge as such is worth little without knowing how to
use it. It is likely to be so up-to-date that it is out of date tomorrow.
Discrimination, reasoned judgment, and creative thinking must work
upon knowledge to make it fruitful. No one can approach a mastery
of all the details of knowledge in even the narrowest field. But he can
attain the wisdom that will enable him to lay hold upon those details
when and where he requires them and to make something of them.
Without this, the study of up-to-date subjects as merely so many tracts
of knowledge is futile." 2
The powers of discrimination and creative thinking, the necessity of
which Dean Pound emphasizes, are particularly essential to the lawyer.
And the teaching of legal theory is admirably adapted to cultivate those
powers. The dialectic exercises commonly carried on in law class rooms
are well suited to sharpen the student's power of discrimination and to
encourage him in constructive thought. The case material lends itself
admirably to that purpose. Teachers in other fields envy the law teacher
this excellent mind-building material.
There are, too, a good many general principles or doctrines of the
common law that a lawyer needs to absorb and make a part of himself.
The doctrines of mutual assent and consideration in Contracts; the doctrine of contributory negligence in Torts; and the doctrine of respondeat
superior in Agency are examples. They are indispensable as a background against which operative legal facts and explicit rules, must be
considered. The lawyer is like other scholars in that his appreciation of
data depends on what is already in the back of his mind. Decisions and
statutes are significant to the lawyer according to his background. Anyone can see the affairs of life; anyone who can read English can read
our cases, statutes, and regulations; but anyone who reads these cases,
statutes, and regulations without having a background of common law
doctrines will get an idea that is incomplete, warped, and dangerous.
The importance of a sound background of theory and legal doctrine has
increased rather than diminished in recent years. Such a background
affords a basis for putting in order a mass of material that is otherwise
chaotic. A lawyer's knowledge of basic subjects is taken for granted.
'30 American Association University Professors Bulletin 211.
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Our voluminous "tracts of knowledge" do not dispense with the need
to study legal theory.
The recognition-of background courses as such, and the difference
between these and courses in legal workmanship, have implications for
law teachers. A background course 'may well be comprehensive at the
sacrifice of detail. It should put less store on teaching all the details
of a subject and more on the orderly arrangement of the material. It
should view the general field without unduly dissecting it. It should
stress broad implications of cases rather than meticulous distinctions
on fine points; i.e., it should view the forest without getting lost among
the trees.
A first concern of American law schools at this time should be to
put our basic theoretical courses in order. One question in particular
should be considered. Have we not gone too far in the direction of
identifying the theoretical and the practical? One has to do with mind
building and the other has to do with workmanship. They are related,
to be sure; and the difference between them may be largely a matter
of emphasis. But they are not identical. Grammar is a thing apart
from the art of writing. Mathematics is a thing apart from the art of
designing bridges. Chemistry and physics are things apart from the art
of healing disease. Theology is a thing apart from the art of preaching
and the cure of souls. And legal theory is a thing apart from the art
of adjusting human relations. Theory and practice-both importantare not identical.
The attempt to identify the theoretical and the practical may be
partly the reason for our multiplicity of courses. Mr. Laswell and Professor McDougal in their scholarly article dealing with legal education
have noted 3 that we have a "plethora of repetitive secondary coursessuch as Sales, Insurance, Credit Transactions, Bills and Notes." These
courses are indeed repetitive in the sense that they all teach the general
principles of legal transactions. They are secondary in the sense that'
each one stems from the central idea of contracts or-more properlylegal transactions. These courses are kept on a dead level with the general course in Contracts. There is no recognition of Contracts-or
Legal Transactions-as a basic theoretical course with the others set
apart as specialized practical courses. The same kind of material-i.e.,
adjudicated cases-is studied in one type of course as in the other; and
it is treated the same way in both places. The result is that our teaching
of theory is scattered and inadequate. A movement to reintegrate our
teaching of theory would make for brevity, clarity, and order.
The general subject of Legal Transactions, for example, would be
more easily and better understood by students if law schools were to
' Laswell and McDougal, supra note 1, at 233.
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give a course on the general subject instead of continuing to present
Contracts, Sales, Insurance, Agency, and other varieties of legal transactions as coordinate courses. 4 Such a general course might be called
"Legal Transactions"; it might be called "Contracts." The name is not
important.
There would be several advantages in giving a basic and comprehensive course on Legal Transactions. First, it would save time. Second, it would emphasize the unity of the law. The present array of
subjects makes students think that the law exists in compartments.
Third, and this is more important, it would enable teachers to present
legal materials in more effective order-to proceed from the simple to
the complex. The elements of a cash sale, for example, are simpler than
the elements of a contract; but, under the present arrangement, Contracts are presented before Sales. Fourth, it would enable teachers to
dwell on basic ideas-to teach more of the jurisprudence of the general
subject.
The "secondary" courses also suffer from not being recognized as
such. The presentation of a specialized practical course should include
much more than legal doctrine; it calls for information that is not contained in the adjudicated cases. A course in Insurance, for example,
should teach the student how the insurance business is carried on. He
needs to know about rates, forms of policies, special interpretations,
adjustments, and trade practices. He needs to be up to date and not
some years behind, as adjudicated cases inevitably are. We do not have
a special kind of law for each one of the "secondary" subjects. But
each one does have peculiar problems. That is presumably the reason
for segregating it. These problems cannot be adequately presented without supplementing the case material. Economic and social considerations, together with trade practices and administrative regulations, all
bear on the problems that come up in "secondary" courses.
Much has been said in favor of the "functional approach." And
certainly the bearing of law on business and social living is a matter of
first importance. But the vastness of our law is overwhelming unless
it can be kept in order by some pervading theory. The functional approach and the theoretical approach are both important. Let us not
exalt either one to the disregard of the other. In fact we need to intensify our presentation of both. That is not done by keeping courses
on a dead level, each one being final instruction in both legal- theory and
the functional application of law to a particular kind of business-such
as Sales, Banking, or Insurance.
The literature used in presenting a theory course on one hand or a
'See Merton LeRoy Ferson, The Nature of Legal Transactions and Juristic
Acts: Analysis of Common, Factors and Variations,31 CoRN. L. Q. 105-81 (1945).
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"functional" course on the other, may well be different. Cases are excellent for presenting theory. But law as the handmaid to business
includes statutes, regulations, rules and directives; business practice must
also be taken into account.
In these premises it would seem that a basic course in the theory
that runs through all legal transactions would be helpful. With that
field once covered, the teacher of a functional course could focus his
presentation on the many-sided problems of business.
When we turn to the teaching of practice-other than court practice
-we find the problem is not the revision of conventional methods.
There are none. Imagination, plus a few scattered experiments, must
point the way. New methods are needed. The writer has had experience with two devices that may be worthy of being improved and given
further use in teaching practice-in the broad sense. One has gone
under the name of "Law Institutes" and the other under the name of
"Legal Interneship."
The law institutes that have been conducted in various cities have
been set up for practicing lawyers and in most instances were set up by
bar associations. So far they have been sporadic and not correlated
with any general plan of legal education. They are, however, a means
of teaching practice; and some of their features could be used to advantage in a settled plan of legal education.
It may be taken as characteristic of law institutes that they are designed for mature students. So far they have been attended mainly by
members of the bar. The student's background of legal doctrine is
assumed and the typical institute deals with problems of how to do
things.
The deferment of practice courses until a student is mature seems
to be sound pedagogy. A practice course deals with problems that involve a number of conventional subjects. A course in the planning of
estates, for example, calls for familiarity on the part of the student
with Trusts, Wills, Property, and Contracts. A student is not ready to
study the activities of practice until he has mastered the fundamental
law.
There is further reason for postponing practice courses until the
student has come to the bar. The practice courses are naturally specialized and the undergraduate law student cannot foresee what specialty
he will need. After entering the practice he gets into his groove and
comes to know what functional training will serve him best. The more
generally needed courses in practice-such as the administration of
estates-should be given as a part of the regular law course. The more
highly specialized courses might better be offered to members of the
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bar. The general policy of postponing practice courses until the student
is far along might well be kept in mind in future planning.
Law institutes are characterized also by the type of teachers they
employ. It has been noted that the courses are specialized; it follows
necessarily that the teachers are specialists. It is not sufficient for one
who conducts an institute to know the pertinent law; such knowledge
is assumed. He should be familiar, also, with the current practice and
be able to appraise the various ways of accomplishing what his client
desires. When, for example, the general subject of an institute is
"Wills and the Planning of Estates," it is not enough for the lecturer to
know the law about Wills, Trusts, Powers and Taxation. He must
know the advantage of this or*that legal device. He must be able to
consider varying situations of clients, have regard for tax angles, and
generally to translate the law into the art of using it. The teachers
employed in law institutes have been either lawyers in practice who
specialize or else professional law school teachers who study a specialty
and, on the side, engage to some extent in the practice of that specialty.
Law institutes have been set up sometimes by law schools but oftener
by bar associations. They have sometimes been held in law school classrooms; but oftener in halls more centrally 16cated. They have sometimes been compressed into relatively short periods of full time work
for the students; and sometimes they have been given in evening meetings held at intervals through a relatively long time. These details
naturally vary according to the situations in different communities. The
arrangement and times of giving lectures that may be most convenient
in one locality may not be suited to the needs of another. Generally
speaking evening meetings held at intervals are more convenient for
lawyers in a city; while a full time schedule for a relatively short period
is more convenient for lawyers in small towns who must come to a
center for instruction.
Law schools exist to serve the public and particularly the bar.
Should they not give careful attention to law institutes and consider the
possibility of correlating them and making them more comprehensive?
Perhaps they could be made to complement the regular work of law
schools and to be a more or less permanent adjunct to our system of
legal education.
In default of the establishment of such postgraduate work by law
schools, bar associations have set up law institutes in a good many communities. It would be advantageous for law schools and bar associations
to cooperate in this enterprise. Each has something to contribute. On
one hand, the bar association knows what are the educational
needs of
men in practice. On the other hand, law schools are better adapted to
set up such institutes than are bar associations. School men are experi-
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enced in setting up and administering education programs. There is also
a continuity of policy in schools that does not obtain in bar associations
where officers come and go at frequent intervals. The law schools are
in a favorable position to correlate postgraduate practice courses with
regular law school work. They can adapt each one to the other.
There is another reason why law schools should concern themselves
with law institutes: It is an opportunity for law schools further to
identify themselves with the legal profession. That identity is developing. We see it in the cooperation of school men and practicing lawyers
as they function together in the American Law Institute. We see it in
the rapidly converging ideas of school men and practicing lawyers with
regard to admissions to the bar. This general trend can be accelerated
if the law schools will collaborate in an expert way to set up a form of
legal education that is useful to practicing lawyers. The medical schools
and the medical practitioner have set a significant example. Their experience leaves no doubt that the close cooperation of school man and
practitioner is mutually advantageous.
The legal interneship, like the law institute, contemplates law practice
as something more comprehensive than the forensic practice of earlier
days. Its premises are that when a lawyer comes to the bar he is confronted with such questions as these: How are estates administered?
How are taxes levied, calculated, and collected? How are sales under
foreclosure and execution carried out? How do the city solicitor and
prosecuting attorney prepare their cases? How are cases brought to
issue, trial and decision in the courts? What public records are kept
and how are they indexed-particularly in the recorder's office?
The Trial Courts, the Probate Court, the Sheriff's office, the Recorder's office, the Tax Commission, the Prosecuting Attorney's office,
the city Solicitor's office, and other public agencies are the facilities for
conducting government and for the administration of justice. These
agencies have in modern times become large, complicated, and highly
organized. A lawyer's work consists largely in dealing with such agencies. How can he do this effectively unless he understands the function
and operation of each agency? He needs more than a mechanical knowledge of where to file papers and make applications. He should understand the organization, routine, and purpose that obtains in each of these
public offices. It is impossible to reproduce in a school the public offices
with which a lawyer must deal; it is impossible to imitate the conditions under which a lawyer must work.
The legal interneship, as it was set up in Cincinnati, contemplates a
working arrangement between the law school and a number of public
offices, such as those mentioned above. The gist of the plan is that law
students who are advanced in their study are given employment on a
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no-pay basis in these public offices. The details of the experiment in
Cincinnati had not crystallized when the war came. It had been carried
on, however, during the summers of 1938, 1939, and 1940. The number
of students who served was not large but everyone who desired to serve
was given a place. Each student served for a month or more in the
office he entered. The officers under whom the students served were
extremely helpful. They rotated the students from one duty to another
in order to give a varied experience. Each student who went to the
Probate Court, for instance, was assigned to the filing desk for a week,
then he was required to figure estate taxes for a time, and for still another period he observed the disposition of cases in the courtroom.
The advantage of the legal interneship is that it gives a maximum of
experience in the time a student devotes to it. The public office stands
at the crossroads of practice. A student situated there sees a volume of
law business in a given time that is incomparably greater than he could
see if he were attached to a lawyer's office. He learns the organization,
function, and routine of the public office; he also gains in maturity and
confidence by his association with older men. Another incidental advantage is that it gives the student some inkling as to what type of
practice is most to his liking. To that extent it serves as "vocational
guidance." It is too early to appraise the value of the legal interneship
as a feature of legal education. Experiments with it are, however, so
encouraging that they should be resumed when the war is over.
The general idea running through the foregoing discussion is this:
We should keep in mind the two-fold aim of law teaching: viz., to
imbue the students with comprehensive legal theory and to develop their
techniques. Both are essential to a lawyer.
Suggestions were made with regard to the presentations of our theory
courses. One is that we should teach legal theory in larger segments.
A tendency was noted in American law schools-unlike the British university law schoolss--to divide materials' that are naturally coherent into
numerous courses. The trunk of the law has been too finely split on
functional lines.
The general field of Contracts--or Legal Transactions-was taken
for purpose of illustration.6 Much of the same theory that is studied in
'Consult announcements of British university law schools, particularly the
Scotch university law schools.
'A reduction in the number of subjects could perhaps be made in other fields.
Note Dean Fraser's plan in his Cases on Property whereby he brings nonpossessory
interests and the early methods of conveyancing into "one connected story." He
states in his Preface: "Nonpossessory interests are more extensively treated than
is usual in an introductory course for several reasons. The early methods in conveyancing are more intimately connected with the types of nonpossessory interests
than with present methods of conveyancing. The development of the several types
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Contracts is studied again in Sales, Agency, and each of the other kinds
of Legal Transactions. The same judges decided the cases in these
various subjects. The judges were moved by the same considerations of
logic, fairness, and expediency in every case. The result is that the
same theoretical factor runs through the entire group of subjects. That
theory is obscured by numerous isolated presentations-one for each
kind of business.
It was noted that the presentation of a basic course on Legal Transactions involves much more than the assembling of suitable cases into
one book. The teacher should know what he is driving at. He would
need to view his teaching material from a wide angle; he would need
to stress the broad application of legal theory and he would need to
throw the theoretical significance of cases into bold relief, paying only
minor attention to the current problems of trade.
The extended argument that is here made for a revamping of substantive law courses indicates no lack of regard for practice courses.
On the contrary, it is recognized that our ultimate aim is to make our
graduates useful in the actual adjustment of human relations. To that
end it is urged that we should make our theory courses more theoretical
and our practice courses more practical.
and the methods of creating them are one connected story, and each of them is
better understood when all are considered together. They have a common historical background, and fullness of treatment in one place avoids the necessity for
repetition."

